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In 2005, following the suppression of the Andijon 
uprising, the European Union, alone among world 
powers, took a necessary and principled stance towards 
the regime of Uzbekistan’s President Islom Karimov. A 
visa ban was imposed on officials believed to be 
involved in the indiscriminate killing of mostly 
unarmed civilians, an embargo was placed on arms 
shipments to Uzbekistan and high-level bilateral 
relations were frozen. Now, almost two years later, the 
strain in relations appears to be taking its toll on both 
sides. The Uzbek government has made tentative 
overtures to the EU, and there are indications that some 
in the EU are willing to accept such overtures at face 
value in the rush to normalise relations, often citing 
security and energy concerns, as well as ‘progress’ in 
the sphere of human rights. Unfortunately, arguments 
that Uzbekistan can meaningfully contribute to 
European security – of any kind – and that the Karimov 
regime is willing to reform do not stand up to closer 
examination. While it is to be welcomed that Germany  
chose to make Central Asia a foreign policy priority 
during its Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007, 
any normalisation of relations must be contingent not 
on promises or cosmetic changes from Uzbekistan, but 
on concrete measures taken to improve the lives of its 
citizens. To accept anything less would be to commit a 
grave disservice to ordinary citizens, and would be 
devastating to the EU’s credibility. 
Human Rights Dialogue with Uzbekistan Likely 
to be Dead-end 
As part of its efforts to improve its image in the EU, 
Uzbekistan in November 2006 agreed in principle to 
begin a ‘dialogue’ with the EU on human rights, an 
agreement that has yet to yield any concrete results. 
Even as both sides talk of ‘dialogue’, the relentless 
persecution of human rights activists, independent 
journalists and opposition supporters – both within the 
country and abroad – continues. As an illustration, let 
us recount three recent cases. 
  Umida Niyazova. An independent human rights 
activist who had previously worked for a number of 
international organisations, Niyazova, a 32-year-old 
single mother, was stopped by customs officials in 
December 2006 at Tashkent’s airport while 
returning from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where she was 
a trainee at the OSCE Academy. Customs officials 
confiscated her laptop computer, on which, they 
subsequently claimed, they had discovered 
“extremist materials.” Niyazova left Uzbekistan for 
Kyrgyzstan, where she sought political asylum, but 
then returned to Uzbekistan in January 2007, having 
been told that the charges were dropped. She was 
immediately arrested and held incognito for several 
days in Andijon before being returned to Tashkent, 
where she was charged with the smuggling of 
contraband, distribution of extremist materials and 
illegal border crossing. After a closed two-day trial, 
on 1 May 2007, Niyazova was convicted on all 
counts and sentenced to seven years in prison. 
Following an international outcry, her sentence was 
changed to a three-year suspended sentence; the 
price for her freedom was Niyazova’s public 
repentance and a denunciation of the activities of 
international human rights organisations such as 
Human Rights Watch. 
  Isroil Kholdorov.  A leader of the banned 
opposition movement Erk (“Will”) in Andijon, 
Kholdorov, 57, fled to Kyrgyzstan following the 
2005 uprising and sought political asylum there. He 
continued his public denunciations of the Karimov 
regime, and is believed to have been kidnapped by 
Uzbek security agents and forcibly returned to 
Uzbekistan. On 19 February 2007, he was 
sentenced to six years in prison for, among other 
things, establishing an illegal group, illegal border 
crossing and the distribution of extremist materials.  
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  Gulbahor Turayeva. A doctor and NGO activist 
from Andijon, Turayeva, 40, was an eyewitness to 
the slaughter in Andijon and had repeatedly 
challenged the Uzbek government’s version of 
events. In January 2007, she was arrested while 
crossing the border from Kyrgyzstan, bringing with 
her materials published by the banned opposition 
movement Erk (“Will”). She was sentenced to six 
years in prison in April 2007 for slander, 
distributing threatening materials and infringing on 
the constitutional order. A further conviction for 
slander on 7 May resulted in a fine of roughly $518 
being added to her sentence; initial reports were 
that her prison sentence was also almost doubled. 
As was the case with Niyazova, Turayeva’s 
sentence was commuted to a three-year suspended 
sentence on 12 June 2007, after she also made a 
humiliating public denunciation of her previous 
statements and of the statements of other foreign 
journalists regarding the Andijon events. 
The release of Niyazova and Turayeva is, of course, to 
be welcomed. At the same time, the fact that both have 
been arrested and convicted means that their freedom is 
still at great risk. In the meantime, there are continuing 
concerns about the well-being of other detainees, such 
as human rights activist Mu’tabar Tojiboyeva, 
businessman and political activist Sanjar Umarov, and 
independent journalist (and nephew of the president) 
Jamshid Karimov, all of whom are believed to have 
been severely mistreated in detention. Tojiboyeva and 
Karimov have been subjected to forced psychiatric 
hospitalisation. And Uzbekistan’s prisons remain full of 
thousands of other individuals unjustly arrested and 
imprisoned – in often extremely inhumane conditions – 
on a variety of politically-motivated charges. 
Niyazova, Kholdorov, Tojiboyeva, Umarov, Karimov, 
and others like them are all victims of a regime that 
seems to view any independent activity – be it religious, 
political, economic or cultural in nature – as a potential 
threat. Those who dare step out of line face intimidation 
and harassment − including beatings by unknown 
assailants
1  − arrest on trumped-up charges, and 
perfunctory trials with apparently pre-determined 
verdicts. And persecutions are not limited to Uzbekistan 
itself, as Kholdorov’s case indicates; since the Andijon 
uprising, Uzbek refugees and asylum seekers in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Ukraine have been 
the victims of kidnapping and illegal deportation.
2 
Similarly, Tashkent has done little to address the EU’s 
concerns about its handling of the Andijon uprising. 
The Uzbek government did agree to allow a group of 
EU experts to visit Andijon in December 2006, 
                                                 
1  For example, human rights activists Elena Urlaeva and 
Vasila Inoyatova were attacked in January and February 
2007, respectively. 
2 The Moscow-based human rights organisation ‘Memorial’ 
has been particularly diligent about tracking such cases (for 
more information, see their website, www.memo.ru) 
although the time the EU’s experts were allowed to 
spend in Andijon and the number of people they were 
allowed to meet with in general were limited. There 
have been grudging acknowledgments from the Uzbek 
side that its forces may have made mistakes in their 
response to the uprising. And in October 2006, Andijon 
governor Saydullo Begaliyev was fired by Karimov 
himself, who stated that Begaliyev’s administration, by 
ignoring socio-economic problems in the province, was 
partially to blame for the Andijon events. All 
encouraging signs, perhaps, but progress on this front 
has been stalled as well. The Uzbek government was 
apparently reluctant to hold any further meetings, 
reportedly announcing that the Andijon issue was, in 
their view, “closed.” A second meeting was eventually 
held, yet also yielded no results; a planned third meeting 
has yet to be scheduled. In the meantime, the Karimov 
regime continues to insist – without offering any 
convincing evidence
3 – that the Andijon events were the 
work of terrorists with extensive foreign backing 
(including the alleged support of the US embassy in 
Tashkent, Western-funded NGOs and Western media 
outlets such as the BBC). And acknowledgments along 
the lines of ‘mistakes were made’ fall far short of 
allowing a full-scale, unfettered independent inquiry 
into the bloody events of May 2005. 
It is certainly significant that Karimov pointed to socio-
economic concerns in his sacking of Begaliyev. What is 
often overlooked, however, is that Begaliyev’s style of 
government was the rule, not the exception. Regional 
administrators throughout Uzbekistan are appointed or 
removed at the behest of the president, and are fully 
aware that their political survival – and personal 
freedom – depend on appeasing Karimov, with little or 
no attention given to the needs of the local population, 
to whom administrators are not in any way accountable. 
This is particularly the case in Uzbekistan’s cotton-
growing regions, where local administrators are under 
massive pressure to see to it that government-set harvest 
quotas are met. 
With failure to meet quotas a common reason for their 
dismissal, local administrators resort to whatever means 
they see as necessary. Large-scale forced labour with 
little or no compensation, physical intimidation – 
including beatings – of farmers who fail to deliver, 
seizure of land from those who try to grow other crops 
for subsistence or sale – all are commonplace. With 
more and more young men leaving impoverished rural 
areas to seek work in Tashkent – or leaving Uzbekistan 
altogether – the burden falls increasingly on the women 
and children left behind. As is the case with gas, the 
revenues from Uzbekistan’s cotton fibre exports – 
perhaps as much as $1 billion per year – often vanish 
into off-budget accounts; again, it is thought to be the 
                                                 
3 What evidence the Uzbek government has offered has been 
in the form of confessions from those accused of organising or 
participating in the uprising. Given the widespread use of 
torture in Uzbekistan, evidence consisting solely of 
confessions must be regarded with skepticism.  The EU and Uzbekistan: Where to go from here?| 3 
Karimov regime and its security services who benefit, 
and not the impoverished and occasionally brutalised 
farmers.
4 While Begaliyev and others face periodic 
dismissal,
5 as long as the system itself remains 
fundamentally unchanged, there is little reason to 
expect their successors to act any differently. 
In sum, the steps taken by Uzbekistan to address the 
concerns expressed by the international community on 
the Andijon events and on the human rights situation in 
the country have not been sufficient to justify a return to 
the status quo ante. This is not to suggest that dialogue 
should be abandoned, yet dialogue for its own sake will 
accomplish nothing. Any normalisation of relations 
with Uzbekistan must follow concrete steps by the 
government to improve the lives of its citizens and 
address the international community’s concerns about 
human rights. In the past, the Uzbek government has 
proven willing to make the occasional token gesture in 
these areas when international criticism has grown 
inconveniently strident. Fundamental changes, 
however, have been utterly lacking. During the years of 
its close relationship with the Karimov regime, the 
United States constantly advocated ‘dialogue’ as a 
means to bring about such change in Uzbekistan. The 
Andijon events and the continuing repressions which 
have followed showed convincingly exactly how much 
the years of dialogue with Karimov had accomplished.  
Uzbekistan’s Limited Potential as Energy 
Exporter 
While the EU strategy has not yet been made public, 
concerns have been voiced that it may prioritise the 
EU’s energy concerns over human security and human 
rights concerns in Central Asia. The EU’s desire to 
diversify its energy suppliers is perfectly 
understandable. It is questionable, however, to what 
extent Uzbekistan can genuinely contribute to EU 
energy security. Uzbekistan’s gas delivery network is 
highly inefficient, and barely able to meet the needs of 
its own consumers. The Russian gas giant Gazprom 
enjoys a virtual monopoly on the export of Uzbek gas, 
and given the lack of alternate routes – and 
                                                 
4 For more information, see International Crisis Group Asia 
Report No. 93, The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive 
Monoculture, 28 February 2005. 
5 An interesting case is that of former Jizzakh governor 
Ubaydullo Yomonqulov. A protégé of current Prime Minister 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Yomonqulov had a long-standing 
reputation for violent behaviour towards farmers who failed 
to meet their cotton targets. In February 2007, at a session of 
the local government chaired by Mirziyoyev himself, it was 
announced that Yomonqulov had, on his own initiative, 
submitted his resignation. At this point, it is impossible to say 
whether or not Yomonqulov’s resignation was in fact 
voluntary – perhaps Yomonqulov’s behaviour, widely 
reported by Uzbek human rights activists and independent 
journalists, had finally become an embarrassment to a regime 
seeking to improve its image abroad.   
Uzbekistan’s ever-closer relations with Moscow – this is 
highly unlikely to change any time soon. 
What is more, the small amounts of gas that Uzbekistan 
exports usually come at the expense of its own citizens, 
who face frequent shutoffs of gas during the winter 
months. This has led to increasing discontent within 
Uzbekistan, and demonstrations provoked by 
interruptions in gas supply took place in many regions 
of the country prior to the Andijon uprising. Recently, 
there have been reports of renewed demonstrations, 
particularly in the impoverished Autonomous Republic 
of Qaraqalpaqistan – paradoxically, the source of much 
of Uzbekistan’s gas.  
A further question is what happens to the revenues 
generated by the export of Uzbek gas. As with 
Uzbekistan’s other main export commodities, such as 
gold, cotton and uranium, it is believed that the lion’s 
share of the proceeds do not in fact go into state coffers 
but are diverted into off-budget accounts controlled by 
the Karimov regime and its close allies, particularly in 
the repressive security services. The government has 
announced its intentions to improve domestic delivery 
and boost exports through structural reforms and new 
exploration, yet its own ability to implement such 
measures is limited, and the notoriously corrupt 
investment climate in Uzbekistan seems to be giving 
even such major players as Russia’s Gazprom some 
pause. At any rate, whatever increased production does 
result will inevitably enter the Gazprom-dominated 
delivery system.
6 
In short, it does not seem likely that Uzbekistan can 
contribute in any meaningful way to EU energy 
security. What is more, the manner in which its own 
energy resources are exploited makes them more of a 
force for resentment and instability within Uzbekistan 
itself than a force for socioeconomic development. This 
may have consequences for states or companies seen as 
benefiting from the unfair and opaque use of energy 
resources. Rising public resentment against foreigners – 
and locals – working in the energy sector in Kazakhstan 
are one sign of this, and recent events in the Niger Delta 
show that such resentments can have very dangerous 
consequences over the long term. 
EU in Danger of Misreading the Situation in 
Uzbekistan 
The idea that Uzbekistan can somehow contribute 
meaningfully to European energy security is one of a 
number of false assumptions about Uzbekistan which 
seem to inform much of the policy debate. One idea that 
simply must be abandoned is the view that Central 
Asian society in general – and Uzbek society in 
particular – is “Oriental,” “traditional,” and “clan-
based,” and  therefore  somehow  fundamentally antago- 
nistic to Western ideas of good  governance  and  demo- 
                                                 
6 For more information, see International Crisis Group Asia 
Report No. 133, Central Asia’s Energy Risks¸ 24 May 2007. 4 | Michael Hall 
cracy. In fact, the most stubborn resistance to the 
implementation of political and economic reforms 
comes not from the public at large but from leaders 
such as Karimov, who see such reforms as threatening 
their stranglehold on political and economic life. 
Stereotypes such as these serve both Karimov and those 
abroad who wish to maintain the status quo – or at least 
avoid such sensitive topics. They do a disservice to both 
the citizens of Uzbekistan and the credibility of the 
West. Even if the establishment of a fully-functioning 
multi-party democracy along European lines may not – 
at present – be a priority for the average Uzbek citizen, 
it is indisputable that Uzbekistan’s long-suffering 
population does indeed desire, at the very least, 
fundamental justice, fairness and accountability from 
those who govern them. One reason that groups such as 
Hizb ut-Tahrir are as widespread as they are in Central 
Asia is that they offer a vision of at least some kind of 
justice and accountability, and while the vision they 
offer may be at best distasteful to many in the West, to 
many in Central Asia – particularly in Uzbekistan – it 
clearly represents a preferable alternative to the status 
quo. When approaching Uzbekistan, the EU would do 
well to ask itself which version of ‘justice’ it would 
ultimately like to see take root in Uzbekistan – one 
closer to its vision, or one closer to that of Hizb ut-
Tahrir. Not to stand up for the former may well lead to 
the strengthening of the latter. 
This raises yet another false assumption about 
Uzbekistan’s importance to the West in general: 
namely, that Uzbekistan has an important role to play in 
the ‘global war on terror’ Although occasionally 
lionised by its admirers in the US as a strategic partner 
in the ‘war on terror’ in fact the Karimov regime, 
through its repressive and  exploitative policies, has 
perhaps done more to foster the growth of  radical 
Islamism in Uzbekistan and in the wider Central Asian 
region than it has to contain it. Rampant corruption, 
abuses of power, arbitrary arrest, the systematic use of 
torture, the suppression of any and all legitimate 
opposition movements, the evisceration of civil society, 
the co-opting of religious institutions and the closing 
down of alternative sources of information − all leave 
Uzbekistan’s citizens with fewer and fewer alternatives.  
While the current threat posed by militant Islam in 
Uzbekistan should not be exaggerated – as the 
government itself is wont to do – nonetheless there are 
reasons to be greatly concerned about the long-term 
dangers. And while none of the apparent acts of 
terrorism in Uzbekistan have specifically targeted 
European citizens or interests, terrorists around the 
world have demonstrated their willingness to use 
violence not only against their own governments, but 
against those states perceived as supporting them. 
The Future of the Karimov Regime 
Another question the EU – and indeed, all foreign 
governments seeking to cultivate ties to Uzbekistan – 
should consider is the future of the Karimov regime. At 
present, Karimov himself is in a curious legal position. 
According to Uzbekistan’s Constitution, Karimov’s 
term as president expired on 22 January 2007, seven 
years after his latest inauguration. Uzbekistan’s law on 
elections, however, states that new presidential elections 
can only be held in December of the year in which the 
president’s term expires – meaning, if the letter of the 
law were to be followed, that Uzbekistan would 
technically be without a president for eleven months. 
The Karimov regime, however, has proven adept at 
interpreting the law to suit its own ends, and, where this 
cannot be done, simply changing it to meet the facts. 
There has been some speculation that the regime will do 
exactly this, perhaps by holding a referendum to extend 
the president’s term. A second scenario posits 
Karimov’s stepping aside in favour of a successor, or 
carrying out a symbolic restructuring of government 
while retaining de facto power himself. At present, there 
is no clear sign that Karimov is planning to do either; in 
fact, all indications are that Karimov intends to seek re-
election in December. Given the nature of the Uzbek 
political system, there is little doubt that, if elections are 
indeed held, Karimov will win easily.  
Nonetheless, the issue does again raise a nagging 
question: who will succeed Karimov once he departs the 
political scene? While there has been speculation about 
certain individuals – including Karimov’s daughter 
Gulnora, National Security Service chief Rustam 
Inoyatov, Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and 
Moscow-based oligarch Alisher Usmonov – there is no 
clear ‘front-runner’ in line for succession. This is more 
than an academic question. The sudden death of former 
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov is an example 
of how quickly and unexpectedly change can come. 
Despite predictions that Niyazov’s death could spark a 
potentially violent succession struggle, the transition in 
Turkmenistan has nonetheless been smooth – for the 
time being. It should not, however, be assumed that this 
would be the case in Uzbekistan as well. The people of 
Turkmenistan, for whatever reason, appear to have 
essentially made their peace with Niyazov’s style of 
government, and were never likely to openly challenge 
either his rule or that of his successor. In Uzbekistan, on 
the other hand, the population is many times larger than 
that of Turkmenistan, and anger – and even hatred – 
towards the Karimov regime have been steadily growing 
for a number of years. While Andijon sent an 
unambiguous message as to how serious unrest would 
be dealt with, the underlying tensions have not subsided. 
Furthermore, Uzbekistan, unlike its neighbour to the 
south, has an active radical Islamist underground. And 
Uzbekistan, unlike Turkmenistan, is home to wealthy 
and influential individuals outside of the regime itself, 
some of whom may decide to make independent bids 
for power once Karimov is out of the picture. In sum, 
there are serious reasons for concern about the prospects 
for profound instability, and even violence, in post-
Karimov Uzbekistan. Protracted instability or violence 
in Uzbekistan could well have disastrous consequences 
for neighbouring countries. The EU and Uzbekistan: Where to go from here?| 5 
EU Priorities for a New Relationship with 
Uzbekistan 
A common argument put forward by those who wish to 
see a rapid improvement in EU-Uzbek relations is that 
it is simply impossible to conceive of a Central Asian 
strategy that does not centre on Uzbekistan. First, there 
is reason to question the need for an overarching 
regional strategy for Central Asia, as all five countries 
have taken increasingly divergent paths since 
independence. More to the point, however, this 
approach may greatly exaggerate Central Asia’s 
importance. It is true that, with over 25 million people, 
Uzbekistan is by far Central Asia’s most populous 
country. On the other hand, at least as many people live 
in surrounding countries, countries which, to varying 
degrees, have generally proven more amenable to 
reform than Uzbekistan. Even Turkmenistan, under new 
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov, has 
promised reforms which, in comparison to the 
increasingly repressive and megalomaniacal policies of 
Niyazov, far exceed anything that Uzbekistan has 
committed itself to – although here, too, the EU and the 
international community in general must be cautious 
not to mistake promises for action. Rather than 
struggling to ‘engage’ with a regime that for years has 
stubbornly resisted international appeals for reform, a 
more productive approach may be to increase 
engagement and assistance to those regimes taking 
genuine steps towards improving the lives of their 
citizens.  
Also of concern is Uzbekistan’s ability to make life 
difficult for neighbouring countries, particularly 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While Uzbekistan’s post-
Andijon rapprochement with Russia has led to its re-
entry into Kremlin-backed regional integration 
schemes, such as the Eurasian Economic Communion 
(EurAsEC) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO), this has yet to translate into 
better bilateral relations with other member states. 
Kyrgyzstan has faced serious political pressure from 
Tashkent in retaliation for its granting of political 
asylum to Uzbek refugees in the past; consequently, 
Bishkek has been increasingly reluctant to do so, and 
those seeking refuge from persecution in Uzbekistan 
now face increasing difficulties finding safety. Only 
recently, and very reluctantly, has Tashkent agreed to 
allow visa-free travel for Kyrgyz citizens, a condition of 
EurAsEC membership. Tajikistan’s relations with 
Uzbekistan, never particularly warm to begin with, have 
sunk to an all-time low, with the two countries trading 
accusations of espionage and harbouring insurgents. 
Tashkent has also apparently been seeking to draw 
Russian attention – and investment – away from 
Tajikistan. Visa requirements for Tajik citizens remain 
in place. The fact that both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
are dependent on Uzbekistan for  their gas supplies 
gives Tashkent increased leverage over both. As long as 
Tashkent feels that its ability to exert pressure on its 
neighbours is unchecked, no amount of ‘dialogue’ or 
‘engagement’ is likely to dissuade it from doing so. To 
counteract this, any EU strategy for Central Asia should 
include plans to strengthen the infrastructural and 
energy independence of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan vis-
à-vis Uzbekistan and promoting greater cooperation 
between these two countries and Kazakhstan, which is 
rapidly emerging as the region’s economic locomotive.  
Those who argue for such approaches have on occasion 
been accused of seeking to ‘isolate’ Uzbekistan. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. The aim of such 
a policy would not be to isolate Uzbekistan, but rather to 
reward those governments that demonstrate the political 
will to make positive changes. It should be made very 
clear to the Uzbek government that improved relations 
with and greater assistance from the EU are available – 
provided the Uzbek government takes the first steps 
toward serious reform. Such measures should include:  
  ceasing all persecution of human rights activists, 
independent journalists and supporters of political 
opposition movements;  
  granting access by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) to all those in places of 
detention, and in particular to political detainees;  
  ending the use of forced labour during the cotton 
harvest (a practice that even violates Uzbekistan’s 
own laws); and 
  allowing a full and unhindered independent 
investigation of the Andijon uprising by an 
independent rapporteur, including access to 
returned refugees and those in detention.  
Measures such as these must be regarded only as 
starting points for a resumption of high-level bilateral 
dialogue between the EU and Uzbekistan. Given the 
nature of the Karimov regime, however, even such steps 
as these are highly unlikely. Still, to make even 
symbolic concessions to Tashkent in return for the 
purely cosmetic changes that have so far been proffered 
by the Uzbek side
7 would send the wrong message 
entirely. 
In sum, it is difficult to see how the Karimov regime can 
in any meaningful way contribute to the EU’s energy, 
security, or human rights objectives – however these 
may ultimately be defined – in Central Asia. While the 
normalisation of relations must remain the ultimate 
goal, it must also be made clear that the requirements 
for such a normalisation lie entirely  with the Uzbek 
side. In the meantime, engagement with and assistance 
to those countries that have  demonstrated at least 
genuine commitment to reform and to improving the 
lives of their citizens should be enhanced. It is to be 
welcomed that the EU plans to expand its on-the-ground 
diplomatic presence in Central Asia; to do so in 
                                                 
7 Among these is a much-touted law which would grant a 
greater role to political parties in parliament in naming the 
prime minister. In Uzbekistan’s rubber-stamp parliament, 
however, where no genuine opposition parties are allowed, 
such a change means little. 6 | Michael Hall 
Uzbekistan may still be premature. What engagement 
there is should be only part of the EU’s multilateral 
relations with the Central Asian region as a whole, and 
should be kept only at the level necessary to maintain 
EU-sponsored projects in Uzbekistan aimed at 
improving the lives of ordinary Uzbek citizens. 
To say that Europe’s sanctions against Uzbekistan “are 
not working” is a gross oversimplification. True, the 
economic impact of such measures is negligible. But 
their symbolic importance simply cannot be 
overlooked. For one thing, the EU’s firm and 
unyielding position vis-à-vis Uzbekistan will send a 
strong message to other countries in the region: namely, 
that massive human rights abuses such as the Andijon 
massacre will have consequences for those who commit 
them. On this front, the EU has done much to 
undermine its own credibility – Germany’s granting of 
a visa to Uzbekistan’s then Interior Minister Zokirjon 
Almatov, despite his presence on the travel ban list, was 
a serious blow – and to relax the sanctions regime now 
without signs of concrete progress from Uzbekistan 
would be disastrous. At a time when revelations about 
the abuse of detainees at Baghram, Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo have done serious harm to the credibility 
of the US on human rights, the importance of the EU 
taking a strong stance on human rights becomes 
paramount. 
As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, there too the 
symbolic impact of the sanctions should not be 
underestimated. Put simply, Karimov does not wish to 
be a pariah. While major powers such as Russia and 
China seem willing to strengthen their ties with 
Uzbekistan without asking awkward questions about 
political and economic reform or human rights, it is 
questionable how comfortable Karimov truly is with the 
current state of Uzbekistan’s international relations; his 
long-standing mistrust of Russia, at any rate, is well 
known, and suspicion towards China has deep roots in 
the post-Soviet states, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation notwithstanding. The current state of 
(relative) isolation from the West is probably not 
entirely pleasing to Karimov, who is too savvy a 
politician not to want a greater degree of balance in his 
international relations. This can only enhance the effect 
of Europe’s sanctions. It seems plausible that the 
fumbling, at best half-hearted attempts by the Karimov 
regime to improve its image in the West are an 
indication of how much the current freeze in relations 
rankles in Tashkent.  Tashkent needs Brussels far more 
than Brussels needs Tashkent. In the current diplomatic 
standoff, it must be Tashkent that blinks first. About CEPS
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